Analiza Posted on 2026-09-03 11:35:00

Analysis/ Why does the EU remain very attractive to poorer countries, but not to rich democracies like Iceland, Norway and Switzerland?!

From Edel Strazimiri

Analysis/ Why does the EU remain very attractive to poorer countries, but not to

Nine candidate countries are making progress on their path towards the European Union, with some of them accelerating reforms to meet their membership goals. Ukraine and Moldova have completed the review of their laws with European legislation, Montenegro has closed 18 out of 33 negotiating chapters, and Albania aims to complete negotiations by 2027.

At first glance, this strong interest in joining the EU seems like clear evidence of the Union's attractive power. But there is a paradox: while the poorest countries or those most exposed to geopolitical uncertainties are eagerly seeking membership, some of Europe's wealthiest democracies prefer to stay outside.

The recent vote in Iceland brought this question back to the center of the European debate. On August 29, Icelandic voters rejected the reopening of EU membership negotiations, by 52.8 percent against and 47.2 percent in favor.

The decision is particularly significant because Iceland is not a country that needs the EU to achieve economic or democratic stability. The country is already part of the European Economic Area and the Schengen Area, having access to the European single market and free movement with most of the continent. For security, it relies on NATO.

For countries like Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro, or Albania, membership is not just an economic issue. It is seen as a mechanism to strengthen institutions, guarantee reforms, and create a stable political and geopolitical orientation.

Membership brings access to European funds, investments, the common market and a legal framework that makes it more difficult to reverse reforms. For Ukraine and Moldova, the security factor is even more important, especially in the context of Russia's war against Ukraine and tensions on Europe's eastern borders. This is where the difference with Iceland lies.

“The benefits of EU membership are different for rich, already integrated countries,” argues Tinatin Akhvlediani, head of the enlargement program at the Center for European Policy Studies. According to her, countries that already have prosperity, stability and access to the European market do not experience membership as an economic transformation. For them, the main benefit would be political: direct participation in the decision-making of European institutions. And this is precisely what is harder to sell to voters.

In the case of Iceland, the pro-EU campaign had strong arguments. The Icelandic central bank's interest rates were significantly higher than those of the European Central Bank, while tensions in the Arctic and changes in transatlantic relations had increased the importance of European cooperation. However, these arguments were not enough.

The issue that seemed to have the biggest impact on voters was fishing. Around 90 percent of the country's fishing companies opposed membership, largely due to fears that Iceland's marine resources would be subject to the EU's Common Fisheries Policy.

In a country where fishing is linked not only to the economy, but also to national identity, the idea of ​​transferring part of the control to European institutions is seen as a concrete cost.

The same logic applies to agriculture. Sheep production, dairy products and agricultural activities in Iceland have historically been protected by tariff barriers. Full integration into the European market would bring significant changes to this sector. Thus, for many Icelanders, the question was not whether Europe was beneficial, but whether the additional benefits justified the loss of some national control.

The Icelandic vote is an important signal for Brussels, but it should not necessarily be seen as a rejection of the European project. Iceland is already deeply integrated with Europe. It uses a large part of the European market rules, is part of Schengen and has close economic relations with the EU.

This creates a paradoxical situation: a country can benefit from a large part of the EU's economic advantages without being a full part of its institutions. This is precisely the challenge Brussels faces with wealthy countries outside the Union.

Norway is the clearest example. Through the European Economic Area, it has incorporated a very large part of EU legislation into its system, while rejecting membership in two referendums, in 1972 and 1994. Even today, support for membership remains limited.

Switzerland has also chosen a different path, building a wide network of bilateral agreements with the EU rather than seeking full membership. All three of these countries have something that Ukraine, Moldova, or the Western Balkans do not have to the same extent: functional alternatives to membership.

Is Iceland a wake-up call for the EU?

Not necessarily. Experts warn that Iceland is a very specific case, shaped by a long history of debate over fisheries, sovereignty and relations with Europe. However, the Icelandic vote highlights a real problem with European enlargement. The EU cannot rely solely on the idea that a common market and economic prosperity will be enough to convince rich countries to become members.

For a country like Albania, membership could mean investment, funding, institutional reforms, new standards, and a stronger geopolitical position. For a country like Iceland, many of these benefits are already available in one form or another. So for wealthy European countries, the question is different: what does full membership bring that we can’t get through existing agreements?

The EU needs to better explain what membership offers

This presents Brussels with a new challenge. If it wants the EU to be seen not just as an economic market, but as a political and geopolitical project, it must explain more clearly the value of full membership. The benefit is not just the European fund or the common market. It is also the opportunity to participate directly in European decision-making, to have a say in Union policies and to contribute to the common security architecture.

This is particularly important in a Europe that is grappling with the war in Ukraine, uncertainty over transatlantic relations, and a new strategic competition in the Arctic. Ultimately, the dividing line is not simply between “pro” and “anti” EU countries. It is between those who believe that influence is greater by being inside European institutions and those who think they can preserve key benefits by staying outside them.

The case of Iceland shows that for countries that are already wealthy, stable and integrated into Europe, the case for membership must be much stronger. For Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans, the question is mainly what they gain by joining the EU. For Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, the question is more difficult: what do they gain by joining that they do not already have by staying outside? And this is precisely the new challenge that European enlargement poses to Brussels.

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